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Abstract
This paper examines Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
and Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Both documents affirm freedom of 
religion as a fundamental human right, yet both recognize the need for restrictions on freedom of 
religion when “necessary.” The paper discusses the text of Articles 18 and 9, as well as European 
Court of Human Rights and Human Rights Committee cases interpreting and applying the Articles. 
The paper then analyzes several current laws restricting religious freedom on necessity grounds as to 
whether the restrictions are legitimate or illegitimate under the instruments. I conclude that the laws 
from several States likely do not pass muster, and pose a great risk to religious freedom. 
My second primary contention is that the “principle of secularism” (as defined primarily in 
European Court of Human Rights jurisprudence), without more, is an illegitimate justification for 
restrictions on religious freedom under the ICCPR and the ECHR. More specifically, the principle of 
secularism functioning as a principle by which religious expression may be excluded from full 
participation in democratic government is inimical to the ICCPR’s and ECHR’s vision of religious 
pluralism as “indissociable” from a democratic society. Further, the European Court’s application of 
the principle improperly equates a “secular” government with a democratic government, and as such 
is in tension with prior cases in which the Court has affirmed religious pluralism as axiomatic for a 
democratic society. The paper concludes with a discussion of the case of a pastor in Sweden who was 
convicted for preaching a sermon condemning homosexuality, as a test case for the application of the 
principles discussed throughout.




Freedom of religion, though forming part of the “core” of most conceptions of human 
rights, continues to remain a “particularly controversial right.”1 While religious liberty is now 
viewed by the international community as a “privilege that is so foundational and precious that it 
should be guaranteed by international law,” its scope and function remains open to significant 
debate and disagreement.2 Some attribute this tension in part to religious claims to possession of 
absolute truth, which may result in lack of respect for the freedom of members of other faiths .3 In 
addition, some religious authorities reject religious freedom as an abdication of a divine mandate 
to practice and promote one’s faith publicly, and view conversion to other religions as 
punishable heresy.4
In addition to these specifically religious reasons for narrowing the scope of freedom of 
religion, governments in many regions of the world actively deny religious freedom. This denial 
ranges from the genocide of religious minorities5 to rigid restrictions on churches’ governance 
and practice.6 The denial can take an even more passive form, as seen in a fairly recent case 
before the European Court of Human Rights in which the Court held that the refusal of 
1 MANFRED NOWAK, U.N. COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: CCPR COMMENTARY 310 (1993).
2 ROBERT F. DRINIAN, S.J., CAN GOD & CAESAR COEXIST?: BALANCING RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 1 (2004)
3 NOWAK, supra note 1, at 310.
4
 Daniel Philpott, Religious Freedom and the Undoing of the Westphalian State, 25 Mich. J. Int.’s L. 981, 992 
(2004).
5
 See Nathan Adams, A Human Rights Imperative: Extending Religious Liberty Beyond the Border, 33 CNLILJ 1 
(2000) for detailed description of the slaughter of religious minorities in Armenia, Bosnia and Sudan, as well as 
other instances of slavery, forced labor and torture of religious minorities.
6 See Philpott, supra note 4, at 992 describing such practices in China during the mid to late 1990s.
3Moldovan authorities to officially recognize the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia (after 
repeated applications for recognition) violated the church members’ freedom of religion.7
The most severe restrictions on religious freedom leave no doubt as to their violation of 
international human rights provisions such as Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR) and Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR). However, because these documents allow governments to limit religious freedom under 
certain circumstances, less egregious impingements involve close questions as to whether they 
are justifiable restrictions under the “necessity” provisions of the ICCPR and the ECHR.
This paper will examine whether the restrictions on religious freedom found in a number 
of current legislative statutes around the world—and defended on any of a number of the 
“necessity” grounds—are justifiable under the necessity clauses of the ICCPR and the ECHR.8
As explained in more detail below, the focus of the paper will be on the manifestation of 
religious belief, rather than on the freedom to believe privately whatever one wishes (recognized 
by both instruments as a right that may never be limited by government). Part II will describe 
the relevant textual provisions of the ICCPR and the ECHR, along with commentary interpreting 
those texts, and will describe general principles of law developed by the Human Rights 
Committee and the European Court of Human Rights in deciding cases under the two 
instruments. Part III will describe and examine pertinent decisions of the Human Rights 
Committee and the European Court of Human Rights in their development of principles for 
evaluating whether legislation restricting religious freedom is justifiable under the necessity 
7
 Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and Others v. Moldova, (2002) 35 E.H.R.R. 13. The Court noted that lack of 
official recognition significantly impacted the Church’s ability to function as a church body.
8
 I will be examining the laws of several states but will not be concerned with whether that state is bound by either 
the ICCPR or the EHCR. My concern is with certain types of laws and whether they pass muster under these two 
significant human rights instruments and the judicial bodies that exercise jurisdiction over the disputes arising under 
them.
4clauses. Part IV will evaluate several current laws and argue that certain recurring language in 
the laws is problematic under the ICCPR and the ECHR. Part V will describe and critique the 
“principle of secularism” as a distinct justification for restricting religious freedom. This Part 
will argue that the principle of secularism as it is being defined and applied, particularly in 
European Court of Human Rights jurisprudence, is not a sufficient justification for restrictions on 
religious freedom. Finally, Part VI will consider the case of a Swedish pastor who was convicted 
for preaching against homosexuality as a test case for application of the laws discussed in Part IV
and the principle of secularism discussed in Part V. This part will contend that the Swedish 
pastor should not be prosecuted under the ECHR and the ICCPR necessity clauses, but that the 
language of the laws discussed in Part III could easily be read to proscribe the sermon the pastor 
preached and the principle of secularism as currently defined and applied could also be read to 
do the same.
II. The ICCPR and the ECHR
A. The Right
Article 18 of the ICCPR and Article 9 of the ECHR both declare that everyone shall have 
the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion.9 Both also declare that this freedom is 
individual and collective, embracing the private, inner-life of religious belief (the forum 
internum10) as well as the public manifestation of religious belief, individually or in community,
in the form of worship, observance, practice and teaching.11 The forum internum is inviolable in 
both documents and subject to none of the possible limitations to which the manifestation of 
9
 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, 
U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, entered into force Mar. 23, 1976, Article 18, and Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, entered into force Sept. 3, 1953, as 
amended by Protocols Nos 3, 5, 8, and 11 which entered into force on 21 September 1970, 20 December 1971, 1 
January 1990, and 1 November 1998 respectively, Article 9.
10 P. VAN DIJK AND G.J.H. VAN HOOF, ET. AL., THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS 541 (1998).
11
 ICCPR, Article 18.
5religion is. Manfred Nowak calls freedom of religion and belief in the private realm “passive” 
freedom in that states are prohibited from dictating or forbidding confession to or membership in 
a religion or belief.”12 The other part of this private realm not subjected to restriction under the 
ICCPR is practice that does not touch upon the freedom and sphere of privacy of others, but 
instead “primarily relates to the practice of religious rituals and customs in the home, either alone 
or in community with others.”13
The freedom to manifest one’s religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and 
teaching is the more public freedom of religion that is subject to limitation under both Article 18 
and Article 9. According to the European Court of Human Rights, the freedom to manifest one’s 
religion protects acts which are “intimately linked” to religious belief, such as acts of worship or 
devotion which are aspects of the practice of a religion or belief in a generally recognised 
form.”14 The term “practice” does not, according to the Court, “cover any act which is motivated 
or influenced by a religion or belief” and one does not necessarily have the right “to behave in 
the public sphere in a manner dictated by a religion or a conviction.”15 According to Nowak, 
worship under the ICCPR means the typical form of religious prayer and preaching, i.e., freedom 
of ritual; observance covers processions, wearing of religious clothing, prayer and all other 
customs and rites of the various religions; and teaching is understood as every form of imparting 
12 NOWAK, supra note 1, at 317. This freedom, according to Nowak, not only confers the right to select from among 
existing religions or beliefs but also includes the negative freedom not to belong to any such group or to live without 
religious confession. Id.
13 NOWAK, supra note 1, at 319.
14 Valsamis v. Greece, 24 E.H.R.R. 294, 307 (1997).
15 Id. van Dijk and van Hoof say that while the Commission puts a broad interpretation on the terms “religion” and 
“belief”, “this does not mean that every individual opinion or preference is a `religion or belief’.” Instead, the 
concept has in mind views that “attain a certain level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance.” VAN DIJK 
AND VAN HOOF, supra note 11, at 548. For example, the European Commission on Human Rights has found that the 
wish to be buried in a certain place does not fall within Article 9 because it is not a “manifestation of any belief in 
the sense that some coherent view on fundamental problems can be seen as being expressed thereby.” Appl. 
8741/79, X v. Federal Republic of Germany, D&R 24 (1981), p. 137 (138).
6the substance of a religion or belief.16 In the General Comments to the ICCPR, “practice” seems 
to overlap with both observance and teaching, and includes the freedom to choose religious 
leaders, priests and teachers, the freedom to establish seminaries or religious schools, and the 
freedom to prepare and distribute religious texts or publications.17 Nowak, in recognition of the 
need for “practice” not to include every action or omission motivated by religion or belief, says 
“Religious practice may thus be said to be only that conduct obviously related to a religious 
conviction.”18
B. The Restrictions
Because the public manifestation of religion has the potential to interfere with the rights 
of others or to pose a danger to society, it is not absolute. Article 18 subjects manifestation of 
religion or belief to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public 
safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.19 Using slightly 
different language, Article 9 subjects manifestation of religion or belief to such limitations as are 
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for 
the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms 
of others.20 The General Comment to Article 18 says that these limitations are to be strictly 
interpreted such that restrictions that are not listed in the Article are not allowed.21 Further, 
limitations must be directly related and proportionate to the specific need on which they are 
predicated, and may not be imposed for discriminatory purposes or applied in a discriminatory 
manner.22 One author points out that almost all of the ICCPR limitation clauses use the word 
16 NOWAK, supra note 1, at 321.
17
 ICCPR, General Comment 22.
18 NOWAK, supra note 1, at 321.
19
 ICCPR, Article 18(3).
20
 ECHR, Article 9(2).
21
 ICCPR, General Comment 22.
22 Id.
7“necessary,” indicating that restrictions on rights “are permissible only when they are essential, 
i.e., inevitable.”23 In addition, the European Court of Human Rights has taken care to construe 
narrowly the “prescribed by law” requirement in order to circumvent hiding religious freedom 
violations behind domestic law. In Kalac v. Turkey, the Court said the requirement is designed to 
ensure “a measure of legal protection in domestic law against arbitrary interferences by public 
authorities with the rights safeguarded by paragraph 2.’”24
C. Pluralism as Axiomatic
Both the ECHR and the HRC have indicated that respect for the principle of pluralism is 
fundamental when considering the justifiability of a restriction on religious freedom. The ECHR 
has indicated that government restrictions on religious freedom may be necessary at times in 
order to “reconcile the interests of differing groups and to ensure respect for the convictions of 
all.”25 However, the court has also recognized that the State must remain “neutral and impartial” 
with an aim to the “maintenance of pluralism and the proper functioning of democracy” rather 
than with an aim to “remove the cause of the tensions by doing away with pluralism.”26 In the 
context of freedom of association, the restriction of which requires justifications similar to 
Article 9, the Court has said, “The autonomy of religious communities is in fact indispensable to 
pluralism in a democratic society.”27
In Kokkinakis v. Greece and Manoussakis v. Greece, the Court even more explicitly 
affirmed religious pluralism as fundamental to the question of whether a law restricting religious 
freedom could be “necessary in a democratic society.” Manoussakis recognized a “margin of 
23 ALEXANDRE CHARLES KISS, PERMISSIBLE LIMITATIONS ON RIGHTS, IN LOUIS HENKIN, ED., THE INTERNATIONAL 
BILL OF RIGHTS: THE COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 308 (1981).
24
 Kalac v. Turkey, (1999) 27 E.H.R.R. 552, 560.
25
 Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and Others v. Moldova, (2002) 35 E.H.R.R. 13, 335.
26 Id. at 335.
27 Id. at 336.
8appreciation” for contracting states to restrict religious liberty, but noted that “In delimiting the 
extent of the margin of appreciation...the Court must have regard to what is at stake, namely the 
need to secure true religious pluralism, an inherent feature of the notion of a democratic 
society.”28 In Kokkinakis, the Court said that freedom of religion “is one of the foundations of a 
`democratic society’” and “The pluralism indissociable from a democratic society which has 
been dearly won over the centuries depends on it.”29 General Comment 22 to Article 18 of the 
ICCPR does not use the term pluralism, but requires that States parties proceed with an attitude 
of “equality and non-discrimination” towards all religions.30 Further, in a dissenting opinion in 
Paul Westerman v. the Netherlands, a Human Rights Committee member argued that 
“conscientious objection is based on a pluralistic conception of society in which acceptance 
rather than coercion is the decisive factor.31
Professor W. Cole Durham has called the principle of pluralism a “fundamental axiom of 
international human rights.”32 Professor Michael McConnell, in analyzing U.S. religious liberty 
jurisprudence, has advocated an “animating principle of pluralism and diversity” over against the 
“maintenance of a scrupulous secularism in all aspects of public life touched by government” 
28
 Manoussakis and Others v. Greece, (1997) 23 E.H.R.R. 387, 407.
29
 Kokkinakis v. Greece, (1994) 17 E.H.R.R. 397, 418. Though Article 18 of the ICCPR does not contain the phrase 
“necessary in a democratic society” in its limiting language, the idea of “necessity” is certainly present and seems to 
present the same basic question as posed in the ECHR. In discussing the choice to leave out the particular phrase in 
the ICCPR, one scholar has noted that “It is difficult...to find a basis for concluding that the omissions are 
significant.” KISS, supra note 24 at 306. Kiss also offers possible explanations for the omission while retaining the 
essential meaning of the phrase. See Id., note 67, at 490.
30
 ICCPR, General Comment 22.
31
 Paul Westerman v. the Netherlands, Communication No. 682/1996, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/67/D/682/1996 (13 
December 1999), para. 9.3 Individual opinion (dissenting) by Committee member H. Solari Yrigoyen.
32
 W. Cole Durham, Jr., Religious Pluralism as a Factor in Peace, 2003 Fides et Libertas 43 (2003). Durham argues 
that pluralism is essential to peace, because peace in a pluralistic world “is best maintained through building 
structures of mutual understanding and respect.” Id. at 44. Arguing along similar lines, Nathan Adams says 
“religious tolerance may be essential to ensure the continued viability of the international rule of law.” Adams, 
supra note 5, at 34 (2000). While Durham and Adams ultimately disagree as to the propriety of religious 
“absolutism,” both see pluralism as essential to peace.
9that in his view has too often typified U.S. Supreme Court religious liberty jurisprudence.33 He 
goes on to say, “My position is that the Religion Clauses do not create a secular public 
sphere...[r]ather, the purpose of the Religion Clauses is to protect the religious lives of people 
from unnecessary intrusions of government, whether promoting or hindering religion. It is to 
foster a regime of religious pluralism, as distinguished from both majoritarianism and 
secularism.”34 According to McConnell, his religious pluralism view of the religion clauses in 
the U.S. Constitution contrasts with the Warren and Burger Courts’ “mission to protect 
democratic society from religion.”35 While this view is in specific reference to U.S. religious 
liberty, it echoes the ECHR’s view of an “indissociable” union between democratic society and 
religious pluralism.36
One point of clarity may be necessary on the point of religious pluralism as an axiomatic 
principle. The commentators mentioned above are careful to note that protecting a robust 
pluralism does not require relativism of belief. Durham specifically argues that states “should 
insist on tolerance and mutual respect among citizens, but may not insist that believers 
compromise or relativize their commitment to the truths in which they believe.”37 He warns 
against the view that would equate exclusivist truth claims with “extremism,” and notes that a 
religious community “can claim that its beliefs are true without believing that its beliefs may be 
33
 Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U.Chi. L. Rev. 115, 116 (1992).
34 Id. at 117. Echoing the “autonomy of religious communities” sentiment of the ECHR, McConnell adds that 
religious pluralism is “to preserve what Madison called the “full and equal rights” of religious believers and 
communities to define their own way of life, so long as they do not interfere with the rights of others, and to 
participate fully and equally with their fellow citizens in public life without being forced to shed their religious 
convictions and character.” Id.
35
 McConnell, supra note 34, at 120. He says “The Court does not object to a little religion in our public life. But the 
religion must be tamed cheapened, and secularized...Authentic religion must be shoved to the margins of public 
life.” Id. at 127.
36
 Note that the pluralistic view espoused by Durham, McConnell, and the ECHR should not be confused with an 
“unimpaired flourishing” view of religious liberty, since a pluralistic view of religion will still admit to government 
restriction in appropriate circumstances. See Christopher L. Eisgruber and Lawrence G. Sager, Unthinking Religious 
Freedom, 74 Tex. L. Rev. 577 (1996) for a very interesting critique of this view and for an equally interesting 
espousal of their “equal regard” religious liberty approach.
37
 Durham, supra note 33, at 51.
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imposed on others.”38 McConnell similarly eschews the idea that protecting pluralism means 
requiring religious claims to be “tamed, cheapened, and secularized” in order to find a place 
alongside the beliefs of fellow citizens in public life. Applying these principles to the ECHR and 
HRC, one must not mistake the ECHR’s recognition of the government’s role in ensuring 
“mutual tolerance” as a requirement that religions relativize the fundamental tenets of their 
religion. Indeed, in the context of freedom of expression, the Court has said that protection 
extends not only to popular views “but also to those that offend, shock or disturb.”39
Accepting religious pluralism in principle does not answer the more specific question of 
whether and to what extent government may legitimately constrain religious freedom as an 
exercise of necessity in particular cases. However, accepting religious pluralism in principle does 
further the analysis to the extent that it limits the ability of governments to restrict religious 
freedom on the ground that public manifestation of religious ideas or practice somehow 
constitute a per se threat to democratic government. To the extent that pluralism of religious 
views and practice as a prescriptive norm is “indissociable” from democracy itself, a government
that purports to legitimately restrict manifestations of religious belief from finding full 
expression in society--ostensibly because such a restriction is “necessary” to protect that society-
-bears the burden of showing that a true, identifiable necessity exists to justify the restriction. 
Specifically, a government must identify how curbing religious freedom in a particular instance 
will not violate the axiomatic principle of religious pluralism, and by extension democracy itself. 
Such a view does not preclude appropriately specific justifications for curbing religious freedom, 
but guards against an inversion of the principle that would view robust expression of religious 
38 Id.
39
 Refah Partisi (the Welfare Party) v. Turkey, (2003) E.H.R.R. 1, 9.
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ideas and practice as somehow inimical to a democratic society, and thus subject to restriction 
simply by virtue of its religious nature. 
D. Margin of Appreciation and Level of Scrutiny
Finally, the ECHR and the HRC have had to determine how they should apply these 
principles to particular cases. In order to “balance general societal interests against the interests 
of the individual or group adversely affected by the state’s action” the ECHR has begun to 
develop standards of review such as its “margin of appreciation” doctrine. Under the doctrine, 
national governments are given some discretion as to the manner in which they implement 
European Convention rights.40 When a state’s law falls within a “predictably amorphous range of 
acceptable alternatives” the Court is likely to uphold the state’s law as within the margin of 
appreciation.41 Similarly, the Human Rights Committee has indicated its willingness to look at 
“context” in assessing alleged violations of the ICCPR. In Raihon Hudoyberganova v. 
Uzbekistan, the Committee concluded that there had been a violation of Article 18 of the ICCPR, 
and noted that it had reached its decision “duly taking into account the specifics of the 
context.”42
While the margin of appreciation recognizes the freedom of European states to exercise 
some measure of sovereignty, the level of discretion given to the national government depends to 
40
 Douglas Lee Donoho, Autonomy, Self-Governance, and the Margin of Appreciation: Developing a Jurisprudence 
of Diversity Within Universal Human Rights, 15 Emory Int’l L. Rev. 391, 446, 451 (2001).  Donoho calls the 
doctrine “one of the ECHR’s primary tools for accommodating diversity, national sovereignty, and the will of 
domestic majorities, while enforcing effective implementation of rights under the European Convention.” Id. The 
ECHR has noted that the substance of the notion of public order “varied on account of national characteristics.” 
Manoussakis v. Greece 23 E.H.R.R. 387, 405 (1996).
41 Id. at 452.
42
 Raihon Hudoyberganova v. Uzbekistan, Communication No. 931/2000, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/82/D/931/2000 
(2004), para. 6.2. (holding that a practicing Muslim woman had a right to wear her headscarf during classes at a state 
institution). One of the Dissents in the case agreed with the need “to take into account the context in which the 
restrictions contemplated by those clauses [the “necessity” clauses contained in Articles 12, 18, 19, 21, 22] are 
applied” but criticized the Committee for saying that it had taken context into account when the State party offered 
no explanation for the basis on which it was seeking to justify the restriction on religious dress. Id. at Individual 
Opinion by Committee Member Sir Nigel Rodley.
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a large degree on the content of the right at issue.43 The more fundamental the right, the more 
specifically the limitation on the right must be tailored to the aim sought and the more the means 
chosen must be proportional to the “legitimate” end.44 The scrutiny encouraged by the ICCPR is 
similar in its requirement that a restriction on religious liberty be “proportional in severity and 
intensity to the purpose being sought.”45 Importantly for purposes of this paper, the ECHR has 
specified that restrictions on religious freedom “call for very strict scrutiny by the Court.”46
Thus, while the Court will consider the margin of appreciation and take restrictions on religious 
freedom on a case-by- case basis because of the inherently fact-sensitive balancing between the 
right and the government necessity, the government bears the heavy burden of showing that a 
limitation is actually “necessary” and that it is narrowly tailored to the necessity at issue.
III. Judicial Application:  Specific Cases47
Before moving to an assessment of current laws in light of the above-mentioned general 
principles, the paper now proceeds to a brief examination of specific ECHR cases that have 
considered when and if a restriction of religious freedom meets the necessity requirements. In 
Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia v. Moldova, the Court found that the government’s refusal to 
recognize the Church of Bessarabia was an interference with its freedom of religion.48 The Court 
said that the government was pursuing a legitimate aim of protecting against the revival of long-
43
 Donoho says the ECHR has developed a “hierarchy of rights, deeming some so fundamental to a democratic 
society that little discretion is allowed to national governments” Id. at 454-455.
44 Id. at 454. Donoho also notes that “the Court’s jurisprudence for balancing individual and state interests is 
strikingly similar to that utilized by the U.S. Supreme Court when faced with similar issues.” Id. at 454, note 179.
45
 Nowak, supra note 1, 325. One commentator has urged the formation of an international compelling interest test 
in order to limit the justifications a state can offer for restricting religious freedom. He says such a test 
“presumptively excludes justifications for violations of religious liberty on grounds of subversion, order, 
immorality, or disrespect for religion or a religious figure, while permitting the state to demonstrate compelling 
reasons for departing from this rule to address internationally recognized problems like terrorism, sectarian violence, 
and female genital mutilation.” Adams, supra note 5, at 63.
46
 Manoussakis and Others v. Greece, (1997) 23 E.H.R.R. 387, 407 (emphasis added).
47
 Research for this paper did not uncover any significant HRC cases for this particular section. The discussion on 
Secularism below does include several HRC cases.
48
 Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and Others v. Moldova, (2002) 35 E.H.R.R. 13, 332.
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standing rivalries between Russia and Romania which could endanger the social peace and 
territorial integrity of Moldova.49 However, refusal to recognize the applicant church was not a 
legitimate means to fulfill this aim because the government was not acting neutrally and 
impartially, its concerns about national security and territorial integrity were “purely 
hypothetical,” and the significant consequences for religious freedom were not proportionate to 
the legitimate aim pursued.50 Thus, the Court upheld the ICCPR and ECHR requirement that a 
restriction be proportionate to its goal.
In Manoussakis v. Greece, the Court found a violation of Article 9 when Jehovah’s 
Witnesses were prosecuted for establishing and operating a place of worship without first 
obtaining the authorization required by law.51 The government argued that the authorization 
measures, which included the Greek Orthodox Church in the approval process and criminalized 
the use of a non-authorized place of worship, served to protect public order and the rights, and 
given freedoms of others in the context of the important history of the Greek Orthodox Church in 
Greece and the fact that sects seek to manifest their ideas and doctrines using all sorts of 
“unlawful and dishonest” means and are “socially dangerous.”52 The Court said that “States are 
entitled to verify whether a movement or association carries on, ostensibly in pursuit of religious 
aims, activities which are harmful to the population,” and held that the protection of public order 
was a legitimate aim under the circumstances.53 However, the Court held that Article 9 had been 
violated because the law had been used to “impose rigid, or indeed prohibitive, conditions on 
practice of religious beliefs by certain non-orthodox movements” and “to restrict the activities of 
49 Id. at 334.
50 Id. 339-341.
51
 Manoussakis v. Greece, (1997) 23 E.H.R.R. 387.
52 Id. at 405.
53 Id.
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faiths outside the Orthodox church.”54 The Court concluded by saying that the convictions had 
such a direct effect on freedom of religion that they “cannot be regarded as proportionate to the 
legitimate aim pursued, nor, accordingly, as necessary in a democratic society.”55 The case 
illustrates the limits of the margin of appreciation doctrine when the impact on religious freedom 
is direct and not narrowly tailored to a legitimate aim.
In Kokkinakis v. Greece, the Court overturned the conviction of a Jehovah’s Witness who 
was convicted of improper proselytism after he and his wife engaged in a religious discussion 
with a woman in her home.56 The government argued that it had to “protect a person’s religious 
beliefs and dignity from attempts to influence them by immoral and deceitful means.”57 The 
Court made a distinction between bearing Christian witness and improper proselytism, with the 
former involving “true evangelism” and the latter involving improper pressure and possibly even 
the use of violence and brainwashing.58 The Court said that the Greek law was proper insofar as 
it was designed to punish only the latter, but that Greece had not sufficiently specified the way in 
which the applicant had attempted to convince his neighbor by “improper means.”59 The Court 
thus concluded that the applicant’s conviction was not justified by a pressing social need and that 
the law was “not proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued or...for the protection of the rights 
and freedoms of others.”60
In Valsamis v. Greece, a Jehovah’s Witness student in the State secondary education 
school refused to take part in the celebration of the National Day school parade commemorating 
54 Id. at 408.
55 Id. at 409.
56
 Kokkinakis v. Greece, (1994) 17 E.H.R.R. 397.
57 Id. at 421.




the outbreak of war between Greece and Italy in 1940.61 Her parents contended that pacificism is 
a fundamental tent of their religion and forbids even indirect conduct or practice associated with 
war. 62 The school had previously exempted her from attendance at religious education lessons 
and Orthodox Mass, but suspended her from school for one day for failure to attend the parade.63
The applicant argued that Article 9 guaranteed her right to the “negative freedom not to manifest, 
by gestures of support, any convictions or opinions contrary to her own” and that the punishment 
“stigmatized and marginalized” her.64 The Court rejected the argument and adopted the 
Commission’s view that Article 9 did not confer a right to exemption from disciplinary rules 
which applied generally and in a neutral manner, and that there had been no interference with her 
right to manifest her religion.65 The Commission also noted that Article 9 protects “only acts and 
gestures of individuals which really express the conviction in question.”66
In Hasan and Chaush v. Bulgaria, Muslim believers sought to replace the leadership of 
their religious organization, thereby causing divisions in the Muslim community.67 Soon 
thereafter, the Bulgarian government declared the election of the leader of one of the factions 
null and void, removed him from the position, and set up a temporary governing body pending 
the election of a new permanent Muslim leader.68 The applicants argued that the religious 
community should be allowed to organize according to its own rules, including choosing its own 
61
 Valsamis v. Greece, (1997) 24 E.H.R.R. 294, 298.
62 Id. at 297.
63 Id. at 298.
64 Id. at 317.
65 Id. A v. United Kingdom rejected a claim of exemption from paying taxes, some of which would be used to fund 
the military, on pacifist grounds. The Court said that the obligation to pay taxes is “a general one which has no 
specific conscientious implications in itself...Article 9 does not confer...the right to refuse on the basis of her 
convictions to abide by legislation...which applies neutrally and generally in the public sphere, without impinging on 
the freedoms guaranteed by Art. 9.” A v. United Kingdom, (1984) 6 E.H.R.R. CD 558. 
66 Valsamis, at 306.
67
 Hasan and Chaush v. Bulgaria, (2001) 34 E.H.R.R. 55, 1347.
68 Id. at 1347.
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leaders.69 The government argued that it had a duty to maintain a climate of “tolerance and 
mutual respect” between independent religious institutions, and that the State’s functioning in 
this capacity had no bearing on the Muslims’ right to practice their religion.70 The Court noted 
that religious communities traditionally exist in organized structures and find meaning in 
religious ceremonies and the religious ministers conducting those ceremonies.71 “Participation in 
the life of the community is thus a manifestation of one’s religion.”72 The Court also noted that 
“but for very exceptional cases, the right to freedom of religion...excludes any discretion on the 
part of the State to determine whether religious beliefs or the means used to express such beliefs 
are legitimate.”73 The Court held that the interference was not “prescribed by law” in that it was 
“arbitrary and was based on legal provisions which allowed an unfettered discretion to the 
executive, and did not meet the required standards of clarity and foreseeability.”74
This short list of cases shows the European Court’s commitment to subject a restriction 
on religious freedom to exacting scrutiny, particularly with regard to the proportionality test. If a 
government is pursuing a legitimate aim, but is doing so by direct proscription of religious 
freedom when other means may be available, the law will not stand. Valsamis indicates that the 
Court will not defer to religious sensibilities when the law does not explicitly restrict one’s right 
to manifest religion, but is instead a generally applicable law that requires what is, in the Court’s 
view, rather innocuous participation in a public function.  The paper now moves to an analysis of 
whether legislation currently on the books in certain States, and ostensibly grounded in the 
69 Id. at 1357.
70 Id. at 1357-58.
71 Id. at 1358-59.
72 Hasan, at 1359.
73 Id. at 1362. “State action favouring one leader of a divided religious community or undertaken with the purpose of 
forcing the community to come together under a single leadership against its own wishes” is an interference with 
freedom of religion. Id.
74 Id. at 1364.
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“necessity” exceptions of the ICCPR and ECHR, is in fact faithful to the tenets of those 
documents and the jurisprudence interpreting them.
IV. Legislation “necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the 
fundamental rights and freedoms of others”
A. Legislation
Silvio Ferrari says that in the last ten to twenty years a new breed of religiously motivated 
terrorists, willing to kill in the name of God, has appeared.75 This reality has occasioned a 
pressing need to find a balance between the values of freedom and security, to determine how “to 
reconcile religious freedom and national security in a way that makes it possible to 
simultaneously enjoy them both.76 More generally, many governments around the world have 
adopted measures that are ostensibly “necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals 
or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others” from “extremist” religions or religious ideas.
Ferrari identifies three broad types of government intrusion into religious liberty since 9-11: 1) 
Government creation of laws restricting a variety of fundamental rights that indirectly affect 
religious liberty, e.g. laws making it more difficult to obtain visas, thereby inhibiting missionary 
activities; 2) Government scrutinization of religious organizations, including examining the 
internal operations of religious organizations to ascertain whether the organization might be a 
front for terrorist activity; and 3) Government intrusion into religious beliefs, such as 
investigating subversive doctrine that is “tainted with intolerance, and opposes the democratic 
fundamentals of civil society.” 77
75
 Silvio Ferrari, Individual Religious Freedom and National Security in Europe After September 11, 2004 B.Y.U. L. 
Rev. 357, 358 (2004).
76 Id. at 359.
77 Ferrari,  at 362.
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Examples of such restrictive legislation abound. In Russia, the federal law On 
Counteracting Extremist Activity78 forbids “the founding and activity of [a] public organisation 
whose goals or actions are aimed at carrying out extremist” activities.79 Such prohibited 
extremist activities include “propaganda of exclusion, advocating either supremacy or inferiority 
of citizens on the basis of religion, social, racial, national, religious or linguistic affiliation.”80
This prohibition is not limited under the law to those acts committed in public, and one 
commentator contends that religious groups could face extremism accusations based on private 
doctrinal discussions during regular worship services if the group claims exclusive truth based on 
the “superiority” of its doctrine.81
Another example is the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act enacted in Singapore in 
1990.82 For the purpose of protecting religious harmony (and by extension public safety, order, 
etc.), the Act gives the State the power to issue a restraining order against any religious 
representative who excites “disaffection against the President or the Government while, or under 
the guise of, propagating or practising any religious belief.”83 Such an order can restrain the 
religious representative from addressing a congregation or publishing any text without prior 
permission of the state authorities.84
A third example of legislation limiting religious liberty using the limitation language of 
the ICCPR and the ECHR is the Law of the Republic of Uzbekistan on Freedom of Worship and 
78
 On Counteracting Extremist Activity, Fed. Law No. 114-FZ (July 25, 2002), Sobr. Zakonod. RF, 2002, No. 30, 
Item 3031.
79
 Ferrari, supra note... at 367.
80
 J. Brian Gross, note, Russia’s War on Political and Religious Extremism: An Appraisal of the Law “On 
Counteracting Extremist Activity”,  2003 B.Y.U.L.Rev. 717, 728 (2003).
81 Id.
82
 Ferrari, supra note... at 370, note 51.
83 Id.
84 Id. The Bulgarian Consolidated Draft Law on Religious Denominations is an example of a more procedurally 
focused effort to curtail religious activity by, among other things, enacting very difficult registration procedures 
applied to non- Bulgarian Orthodox churches where non-registration makes practicing one’s religion freely virtually 
impossible. For a discussion of the law, see Atanas Krussteff, An Attempt at Modernization: The New Bulgarian 
Legislation in the Field of Religious Freedom, 2001 B.Y.U. L.Rev 575, 589-600 (2001).
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Religious Organizations. The law lays out numerous guarantees of religious freedom that are 
qualified with significant restrictions on that freedom in the name of national security, public 
order, life, health, morals and rights and freedoms of others. For example, Article 5 of the law 
outlaws “actions aimed at converting believers of one religion into another” and declares 
inadmissible “the use of religion for anti-state and anti-constitutional propaganda...and for other 
actions against the state, society and individual.85
Finally, since at least 1998 France has actively sought to restrict the development of “new 
religious movements.” In 2000 the French National Assembly unanimously approved a law that 
created a civil mechanism for the dissolution of religious entities, placed restrictions on the 
locations of specified “new religious movements,” prohibited dissemination of information 
regarding new religious movements, and criminalized “mental manipulation” or brainwashing.86
The effects of this and other initiatives targeting religious minorities include, among other things, 
harassment in the workplace, harassment at school, heightened investigations of religious 
organizations financial management systems, imposition of excessive taxes on donations to 
religious organizations, and denial of child custody to a parent because of religion.87
B. Legitimate or Illegitimate Restrictions on Religious Freedom?
1. Facially Invalid?
a. Overbreadth and Vagueness
The initial question in evaluating the laws laid out in Part IV A. is whether, to borrow 
categories from United States Constitutional law, the laws are facially invalid under the ICCPR 
85
 Quoted in Grant Garrard Beckwith, note, Uzbekistan: Islam, Communism, and Religious Liberty—An Appraisal of 
Uzbekistan’s 1998 Law “On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations”, 2000 B.Y.U. L.Rev 997, 1042 
(2000).
86 See Hannah Clayson Smith, note, Liberte, Egalite, et Fraternite At Risk For New Religious Movements in France, 
2000 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 1099, 1100 (2000).
87 Id. at 1117. See FNs 95-101detailing instances of each of these effects, i.e. FN 101 noting at least 11 cases in 
which mothers were denied custody of children in divorce proceedings because they were members of a NRM.
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or the ECHR. In the United States, a plaintiff may challenge the facial validity of a law 
regulating speech under overbreadth and vagueness doctrines, thereby arguing that the law 
potentially proscribes speech that is protected under the First Amendment.88 Overbreadth 
requires a showing that a law punishes a “‘substantial’ amount of protected free speech, `judged 
in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.’”89 Such a showing serves to invalidate the 
entire law “out of concern that the threat of enforcement of an overbroad law may deter or 
“chill” constitutionally protected speech—especially when the overbroad statute imposes 
criminal sanctions.”90 Overbreadth is rarely found, however, because the U.S. Supreme Court 
recognizes that blocking application of a law to constitutionally unprotected speech, or especially 
to constitutionally unprotected conduct, could cause substantial social costs. Thus, the “strong 
medicine” of overbreadth invalidation is used sparingly.91
The related doctrine of vagueness allows a challenge to a law that is not a “sufficiently 
definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and 
practices.”92 Sullivan and Gunther point out that the doctrine draws on the procedural due 
process requirement of adequate notice, but is also aimed at preventing selective enforcement.93
The Court has said the purpose of the vagueness doctrine is to “prevent arbitrary and 
88
 It is important to note that while overbreadth and vagueness doctrines apply primarily, if not exclusively, to 
freedom of speech in U.S. jurisprudence, international law protections of freedom of religion specifically include 
manifestations involving speech, namely teaching religious points of view. See Nowak, supra note 1, at 321. One 
commentator has noted that international law “expressly links religious liberty with virtually every major human 
right, including, inter alia, freedom of association, freedom of speech, the norm of non-discrimination, [and] due 
process.” Adams, supra note 5, at 23.
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 Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 118 (2003) (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973).
90 Id. at 119. This chilling effect may cause people to “abstain from protected speech...harming not only themselves 
but society as a whole which is deprived of an uninhibited marketplace of ideas.” Id.
91 Id. The Court says “Rarely, if ever, will an overbreadth challenge succeed against a law or regulation that is not 
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AND GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, FOURTEENTH EDITION 1298-1299 (2001).
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discriminatory enforcement of a law.”94 In further describing unconstitutionally vague laws, the 
Court has used phrases such as “unascertainable standard” where essentially “no standard of 
conduct is specified at all.”95
b. “Prescribed by Law”
Though the ICCPR and the ECHR use the phrase “prescribed by law” rather than 
overbreadth and vagueness, the terms have analogous aspects. In Kokkinakis, the applicant
argued that the absence of any description of the “objective substance” of the offense of 
proselytism “would tend to make it possible for any kind of religious conversation or 
communication to be caught by the provision” and that the vague language risked 
“extendability” by the police and the courts to permissible exercises of religious freedom.96 The 
Court rejected this contention, noting that the wording of many statutes is “not absolutely 
precise” and “that many laws are inevitably couched in terms which, to a greater or lesser extent, 
are vague.”97 The Court further noted that the existence of a body of settled national case law 
was sufficient to enable the applicant to regulate his conduct according to the law. Though the 
Court rejected the overbreadth and vagueness contention, its discussion indicates the possibility 
that a law may be struck down under the ECHR on vagueness grounds.
In Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia, the ECHR said that “prescribed by law” not only 
requires that “an impugned measure should have a basis in domestic law, but also refers to the 
quality of the law in question, which must be adequately accessible and foreseeable, that is to 
say, formulated with sufficient precision to enable the individual...to regulate his conduct.”98 To 
meet these requirements a domestic law “must afford a measure of legal protection against 
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arbitrary interferences by public authorities with the rights safeguarded by the 
Convention...[c]onsequently, the law must indicate with sufficient clarity the scope of any such 
discretion conferred on the competent authorities and the manner of its exercise.”99
c. “Necessary”
Another way to challenge facial validity under the ICCPR or the ECHR would be to 
argue that the law in question could never, under any circumstances, be necessary to protect 
public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedom of others—or to use 
the language of the ECHR, the law could never be “necessary in a democratic society.” Thus, it 
must be struck down as facially invalid.
d. Analysis
A facial validity challenge necessarily depends upon the specific wording of the statute in 
question. For this reason, the analysis here will assess the facial validity of the several 
representative statutes described above. First, none of the statutes would likely fail as facially
invalid under the ICCPR or ECHR on the ground that the restrictions could never be necessary in 
a democratic society, because one could imagine any number of scenarios under which even the 
most restrictive language of the statutes might be necessary. For example, Russia’s law on 
Counteracting Extremist Activity forbids “propaganda of exclusion, advocating either supremacy 
or inferiority of citizens on the basis of religion.” One can easily imagine a situation in which 
members of one religion might propagate their religious beliefs in such a demeaning or 
aggressive way that others ’ fundamental rights—to privacy or to their own religious freedom—
are violated. On a broader scale, the tensions that sometimes exist between religions could, based 
upon active spreading of disparaging ideas about a competing religion, lead to unrest that 
threatens the public order or safety. It would then be necessary for the government to restrict 
99 Id. at 333.
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such “propaganda” and “advocacy.”100 Further, research for this paper did not discover a single 
case in which a law was declared facially invalid on this ground. 
Second, although vagueness and overbreadth are closer questions, the examples 
referenced here would likely survive an overbreadth challenge as well. Though the laws might
apply to religious expression that the government could not in some cases justify restricting, the
“plainly legitimate sweep” of these laws in relation to that possibility would likely protect them 
from an overbreadth challenge. The exception to this conclusion would be the Uzbekistan 
provision prohibiting “actions aimed at converting believers from one religion to another.” In 
Kokkinakis, the Court expressly allowed “appropriate” proselytizing. Thus, a blanket ban on 
attempting to convert another, without specifying what would constitute an impropriety, would
fail an overbreadth challenge.
The vagueness question, with which the ECHR has explicitly dealt, raises more 
significant problems for the validity of the laws because a religious organization or one of its 
members could easily have difficulty determining what activities or teaching of its religion might 
count as “exclusionary” or “anti-state.” For example, at this author’s public undergraduate 
institution, a debate took place entitled “Can We Be Good Without God?” An atheist argued that 
being a moral person and having a theoretical basis for moral opinions does not require belief in 
a higher power. A Christian argued that a philosophically sound moral system requires the 
existence of a higher power. He went on to argue that among the higher power “options” the God 
of Christianity is the most rational explanation for a moral system and for being a moral person. 
The talk did not contain any explicit condemnation of other religious viewpoints, nor did it 
100
 A similar argument would apply to the restrictions on NRM’s in France and the anti-propaganda provisions of the 
Singapore law.
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attempt to persuade audience members to convert to Christianity. The aim was a religious 
explanation for morality, held out as superior to other religious or non-religious explanations.
The question with respect to vagueness (or “prescribed by law”) is whether the law is
“formulated with sufficient precision” to enable citizens to regulate conduct accordingly.101 I 
would argue that it is not clear whether the foregoing example of the debate at a public 
institution could be prosecuted as extremist under Russia’s law prohibiting “propaganda of 
exclusion, advocating either supremacy or inferiority of citizens on the basis of religion,”
because the statute is not clear about these terms.  As such, the law does not put the Christian 
debater sufficiently on notice that he could be prosecuted. The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty 
criticized Sweden’s Law Against Expression of Disrespect on similar “no objective assessment” 
grounds:  “This law prohibits the expression of “disrespect” towards favored minority 
groups...and lacks any objective standard for identifying disrespect.” 102 A similar lack of 
objective standard exists with regard to “exclusion” in the Russia statute, “propaganda” in the 
Uzbekistan statute, and “disaffection” in the Singapore statute. Even so, it is not clear that the 
ECHR would invalidate any of these measures on vagueness grounds given its care to note that 
laws cannot account for every eventuality. Further, because the language in each of the statutes 
can be construed as furthering a legitimate aim of government (i.e. proscribing treatment of other 
citizens as inferior on the basis of religion), it is likely that they would not be struck down as 
facially invalid on vagueness grounds. I predict that the Court would want to adjudicate an “as-
applied” claim to determine the necessity of the statute under the particular circumstances, and 
whether any conviction under the statute was proportional to the aim pursued.
2. Invalid “As-Applied”?
101
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Of course, the nature of an “as-applied” inquiry necessarily depends on the facts of 
particular cases.  However, considering hypothetical situations to which these laws may be 
applied helps in determining their overall fitness. It seems clear that Russia’s prohibition on 
“exclusion,” for example, could easily be applied to proscribe the Christian debater’s claim that 
Christianity is a superior basis for morality as compared to other religions. I suggest that it is 
equally clear that such an application would violate the ICCPR and the ECHR.  Insofar as the 
speech was an explanation of a religiously motivated belief, the European court would probably 
rule as it did in Kokkinakis by saying that expression of religious conviction absent overt 
pressure or violence cannot be punished as criminal. Further, prosecution of such a manifestation 
of religious belief would likely be scrutinized very closely, in part because it would constitute a 
“direct effect” on freedom of religion. As such, it would violate the principle of proportionality 
unless the necessity the government puts forth was closely connected to a legitimate aim (and the 
more direct the restriction, the more difficult this showing). The debater would have to show that 
the views he expressed in the speech were intimately tied to his religious belief, since not every 
opinion or preference qualifies as a belief under the instruments.103  But because the speech 
involved “some coherent view on fundamental problems”104 and was “obviously related to 
religious conviction”105 he would satisfy this requirement. As such, to be justified in prosecuting 
the expression of this religious viewpoint, the government would have to show some specific 
necessity, under the circumstances, that made the restriction necessary.106
103 See VAN DIJK AND VAN HOOF, supra note 16.
104 Id.
105 NOWAK, supra note 1, at 321.
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Beyond this particular hypothetical, the Singapore Maintenance of Religious Harmony 
Act’s prohibition of exciting disaffection could easily be applied to restrain religiously motivated 
opposition to government policy or practice. Because many religious traditions (not to mention 
democratic principles generally) view actively opposing unjust or immoral government action or 
cultural tendencies as essential to their mission, this proscription could easily curtail important 
religious freedoms. In addition, many traditions actively attempt to persuade individuals and 
government of the correctness of their views on a whole host of issues that touch the political 
arena. Much of this activity could be viewed under these laws as subversive, and thus 
proscribable merely for being in conflict with a government policy or declaration. For example, 
if a citizen of the United States opposed the United States Supreme Court decision in Lawrence 
v. Texas, in which the Court struck down a state law prohibiting consensual sodomy, and 
distributed fliers in a community condemning the decision and expressing moral disagreement 
with homosexual sodomy, he or she could easily be viewed as spreading “disaffection 
against...the Government.” However, such activity is expressly allowable under the ICCPR, and 
without some justification beyond the substantive religious disagreement, such as advocacy of 
violence or other forms of disruptive dissent, the restriction would violate the instrument.107
Similarly, while France’s NRM law allows dissolution of new religious entities 
ostensibly to guard against abuse of the religious freedoms of others, the government’s power of
heightened investigation and dissolution of religious entities because they are “new” is an 
illegitimate restriction on religious freedom. In addition, singling out members of NRMs for 
individualized restriction simply because of membership in a minority religious group, without 
showing a specific “pressing social need” is illegitimate. Such restrictions by extension restrain 
the freedom of those who may want to convert to a NRM, thus causing a substantial violation of 
107 See ICCPR General Comment 22.
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a person’s freedom to believe what he or she wants and the freedom to belong to the religion of 
one’s choice. The treatment of religious minority groups in France is exactly the type of religious 
discrimination that the ICCPR and the ECHR forbid. The language of these laws and others like 
them, while possibly not facially invalid, poses serious risks of restricting religious activity for 
reasons other than the necessity required under the ICCPR and the ECHR.
V. The “Principle of Secularism”
A. Legislation and case law
In addition to laws curtailing religious freedom under the specific necessities of the 
ICCPR and the ECHR, some find their justification in the “principle of secularism.” The 
principle carries with it the notion that government and society must be protected from religious 
overreaching in order to preserve the secular nature of government and the public. For example, 
France’s “law on secularism” went into effect on September 2, 2004 and reads as follows: “In 
public [primary and secondary schools], the wearing of symbols or clothing through which the 
pupils ostensibly manifest a religious appearance is prohibited.”108 Since September, a total of 48 
students have been expelled under the law, most of them Muslim girls who refused to remove 
their religious headscarves in class.109 In banning the wearing of religious symbols, one French 
official said that one purpose of the law was to encourage “mutual respect,” thus implying that 
wearing a religious symbol to school is disrespectful to those of other religions.110 Similarly, in 
2003 a Swedish pastor was convicted and sentenced to one month imprisonment under a 
Swedish law banning disrespectful speech.111 Though the principle of secularism was not 
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invoked explicitly in the case, the idea of protecting others from offense and disrespect echoes 
one of France’s justifications for its 
”secularism” laws.
While research for this paper did not identify any HRC cases dealing explicitly with this 
issue, the HRC has indirectly considered the question in one case. In Mr. Kenneth Riley, et al. v. 
Canada, 112 the Committee found in favor of the Canadian Government, which had allowed a 
Sikh member of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police to wear his turban in place of the traditional 
“mountie” Stetson and forage cap that comprised the standard uniform. Two retired RCMP 
officers brought the Complaint, arguing that display of such a symbol by national police 
constituted a state endorsement of religion by granting “special status” to the Sikh adherent. The 
authors claimed that in order to protect their rights under Article 18 of the Covenant, “the State 
should remain secular.”113 In rather conclusory fashion, the Committee held that “the authors 
have failed to show how the enjoyment of their rights under the Covenant has been affected by 
allowing a Khals Sikh officer to wear religious symbols.”114 In so holding, the HRC rejected the 
idea that a “principle of secularism” required prohibiting a manifestation of religious belief by a 
member of a state controlled institution.
In a similar clash, Turkey removed the air force high command’s director of legal affairs 
for “having adopted unlawful fundamentalist opinions.”115 The Turkish government argued that 
the dismissal constituted a disciplinary sanction for failure to “uphold the secular nature of the 
state.”116 In upholding the dismissal, the ECHR said that the compulsory retirement was not an 
112
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interference with freedom of religion or belief, but “was intended to remove from the military 
legal service a person who had manifested his lack of loyalty to the foundation of the Turkish 
nation, namely secularism, which it was the task of the armed forces to guarantee.”117
Following Kalac, the Court found that discharge of a non-commissioned officer of the 
army was not a violation of his rights under Article 9 of the Convention.118 The applicant 
contended that his dismissal was based on his religious convictions and the fact that his wife 
attempted to get a social security card with a photograph showing her carrying an Islamic 
scarf.119 The government asserted as its grounds for dismissal the applicant’s membership in 
sects known to have “unlawful fundamentalist tendencies,” his attendance at “ideological” 
meetings, and his disciplinary offences while in the army. According to Turkey “any attitude or 
conduct such as the applicant’s antisocial character or his wife’s...Islamic scarf had not been 
taken as the sole basis for his discharge from the army.”120
In response, the applicant argued that the principle of secularism should guarantee 
freedom of religion and conscience rather than operating as a bar to manifestation of religious 
belief.121 The ECHR recognized that religion is one of the foundations of a democratic society, 
but said that where several religions coexist within one and the same population, “it may be 
necessary to place restrictions on this freedom in order to reconcile the interests of the various 
groups and ensure that everyone’s beliefs are respected.”122 Further, the Court said that pursuing 
a military career implies acceptance of the possibility of “placing on certain of the rights and 
freedoms of members of the armed forces limitations which could not be imposed on 
117 Id. at 563.
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civilians.”123 The Court said that states may forbid “an attitude inimical to an established order 
reflecting the requirements for military service...[and] may include a duty for military personnel 
to refrain from participating in the Islamic fundamentalist movement.”124 Finally, the Court 
noted with approval that the Supreme Military Council’s dismissal order was not based on 
religious beliefs or opinions or performance of religious duties, but rather on “his conduct and 
activities in breach of military discipline and the principle of secularism.125
The Court also has developed the principle of secularism in analyzing alleged violations 
of Article 11 of the Convention, which delineates the freedom of assembly and association and 
uses limitation language similar to Article 9. In a case involving a political party of the Turkish 
Parliament, the Turkish Constitutional Court dissolved the party and banned its leaders from 
holding similar office in any other party for five years because the party had become “a centre of 
activities contrary to the principles of secularism.”126 In support of the holding, the 
Constitutional Court cited numerous speeches given by members of the party advocating violent 
overthrow of the government.127 The Turkish Court also noted that “secularism was one of the 
indispensable conditions of democracy” and that intervention by the State “to preserve the 
secular nature of the political regime had to be considered necessary in a democratic society.”128
Further, the Court noted that in a secular regime, religion can have no authority over the 
constitution and governance of the state. But the Court went further, saying: 
Conferring on the State the right to supervise and oversee religious matters cannot be 
regarded as interference contrary to the requirements of a democratic society... 
Secularism, which is also the instrument of the transition to democracy, is the 
philosophical essence of life in Turkey. Within a secular State religious feelings simply 
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cannot be associated with politics, public affairs and legislative provisions. Those are not 
matters to which religious requirements and thought apply.”129
The ECHR held in favor of the Turkish government, and in doing so discussed the 
relationship between democracy and religion. First, the Court reiterated the necessity of placing 
restrictions on religion in order to reconcile the interests of various groups and ensure that 
everyone’s beliefs are respected.130 Second, it noted the State’s role as the “neutral and impartial 
organiser of the exercise of various religions, faiths and beliefs,” but noted that this duty is 
incompatible with any power on the State’s part to assess the legitimacy of religious beliefs.”131
Third, the Court said that in a democratic society the State “may limit the freedom to manifest 
religion, for example by wearing an Islamic headscarf, if the exercise of that freedom clashes 
with the aim of protecting the rights and freedoms of others, public order and public safety,”132
and it may impose on its civil servants the duty to refrain from taking part in the Islamic 
fundamentalist movement, “whose goal and plan of action is to bring about the pre-eminence of 
religious rules.”133 Finally, the Court said that freedoms guaranteed by Articles 9, 10, and 11 of 
the Convention “cannot deprive the authorities of a State in which an association, through its 
activities, jeopardises the State’s institutions, of the right to protect those institutions.”134
In its Article 10 analysis, the Court noted two other aspects of the protection of individual 
rights that round out the picture. First, the Court noted that freedom of expression “is applicable, 
subject to paragraph 2, not only to “information” or “ideas” that are favourably received or 
129 Id. at 18.
130 Id. at 33.
131 Refah Partisi at 33.
132 Id. at 33.
133 Id. at 34. The Court emphasized the context of Turkey where measures taken to prevent undue pressure on 
students may be legitimate under Article 9(2). This regulation may include limiting the manifestation of the rites and 
symbols of the majority religion by “imposing restrictions as to the place and manner of such manifestation with the 
aim of ensuring peaceful co-existence between students of various faiths and thus protecting public order and the 
beliefs of others.” Id.
134 Id. at 34-35.
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regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or 
disturb.”135 As the HRC notes in its General Comment 22, an integral part of religious freedom is 
the freedom to express religious views, whether through publication and dissemination of 
religious materials or through religious teaching.136 Thus, the spirit of the religious freedom 
protections in both the ICCPR and the ECHR include the freedom to espouse religious ideas and 
practice religious activity that may be unpopular with majority religions or society at large, again 
subject to the necessity limitations in both instruments. As the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty 
said in a recent Legal Memorandum to the government of Sri Lanka, “Although [religious] 
beliefs may be unsettling to some, the freedom to discuss and disseminate such controversial 
beliefs—orally or in writing, privately and in public, individually or in community—is firmly
embedded in the freedom to manifest religious belief.”137 Second, in Ozdep v. Turkey, the Court 
found that Turkey had violated Article 11 of the Convention (freedom of association) by 
dissolving the Freedom and Democracy Party of Turkey. The Court called it “essential” that it 
found nothing in the OZDEP’s program “that can be considered a call for violence, an uprising 
or any other form of rejection of democratic principles.”138 Further, the Court called it the 
“essence of democracy” to allow diverse political projects, “even those that call into question the 
way a State is currently organised, provided that they do not harm democracy itself.”139 Thus, 
when unpopular ideas don’t explicitly threaten a democratic government or the rights of others, 
they are protected under Article 11 of the ECHR.
B. Analysis
135 Refah Partisi, at 32-33. See also Ozdep v. Turkey, (2001) 31 E.H.R.R. 27, 701.
136
 ICCPR, General Comment 22.
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 Becket Fund for Religious Liberty Legal Opinion Letter and Memorandum to President Chandrika Bandaranaike 
Kumaratunga and Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapakse of Sri Lanka, p. 7. Available at 
http://www.lankaliberty.com/efforts/SLOpinionLetter.pdf.
138 Ozdep at 702.
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There are significant problems with the principle of secularism as a ground for restriction 
of religious liberty, and with the ECHR’s enforcement of the principle. The first, and most 
obvious, is that neither the ICCPR nor the ECHR list defending secularism in principle as a 
ground upon which manifestation of religious belief may be restricted. As discussed above, the 
necessity clauses are to be construed “strictly” as an exhaustive list of possible justifications.140
Thus, defending the secular nature of the government from religious influence, without a more
specific showing that such influence is actually a threat to the public welfare, is not a sufficient 
reason to curtail religious freedom.
Second, the principle of secularism as practiced contradicts the view that robust religious 
pluralism is fundamental to democracy.141 To the extent that the principle of secularism functions 
as an exclusionary mechanism for public expression of religious views, it is in conflict with the 
robust pluralism embraced by both the ECHR and the ICCPR. The pluralism embodied in these 
instruments is normative rather than descriptive. That is, it is not merely an observation that 
different religions exist, but rather a requirement that governments allow religion to flourish in 
society so long as this flourishing does not violate specifically defined limits. Normative 
pluralism admits to a government right to restrict religious expression if that expression is truly a 
threat to others or to government. Such restrictions may not, however, require a religious 
believer to change his or her manifestation of religious belief and practice based simply on 
suspicion of religiously informed opinions or specific religious groups, or on keeping democratic 
government free from the influence of religious ideas.
140 See supra note 22.
141 See supra section ????
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Central to the notion of pluralism is full participation in public life without being required 
to leave religious motivations or beliefs in private.142 Thus, the Turkish government’s position in 
Refah Partisi that “religious feelings simply cannot be associated with politics, public affairs and 
legislative provisions” is incompatible with the concept of pluralism as indissociable from 
democracy. The ECHR’s endorsement of such a view is in conflict with its explicit endorsement 
of religious pluralism and its duty to require specific necessity to curtail religious freedom. To 
the extent that Turkey and France, in their application of the principle of secularism, are simply 
shielding government and other citizens from the influence of committed religious believers, 
they violate the principle of pluralism, and by extension, democracy. Still more, to the extent that 
Turkey excludes participation in public government on the basis of certain religious practices or 
on the basis of membership in a religious group, or put a different way, conditions participation 
in public government on disavowal of such belief or membership, it violates the principle of 
pluralism.
In its cases before the ECHR on this subject, Turkey seems to equivocate the notions of 
“secularism” and “democracy.” In doing so, the argument goes something like this: protecting 
democracy in Turkey essentially requires protecting government from the influence of religion, 
because in order to thrive as a democratic country we must keep our government “neutral” (i.e.
secular). Thus, in arguing for the principle of secularism, we are merely arguing for the principle 
of democracy. The ECHR seems to endorse this equivocation as within the margin of 
appreciation for Turkey by speaking of the democratic “context” in Turkey.143 Turkey is right to 
think that human rights are linked to the protection of democratic government in the ICCPR and 
142
 Note that here I am not speaking of active efforts to install a theocratic form of government in place of a 
democratic form of government. This would clearly require restriction. I am speaking of religiously motivated and 
even explicitly religious ideas put forth in hopes of helping shape a more effective democratic society. 
143 See Baspinar at 34.
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the ECHR.144 However, neither instrument endorses the view that human rights, and particularly 
religious freedom, are linked to the protection of secular government, when secular means 
protected from the influence of religion.145 So long as protecting democracy (or secularism) 
consists of restricting religious expression if it seeks to influence or criticize government (as in 
Turkey) or merely seeks to express religious sensibility in public (France’s ban on religious 
symbols in public schools), it is not justifiable under the ICCPR or the ECHR.
Indeed, even the expression of a sentiment such as “I would like my religion to hold a 
dominant place in government” or “According to the dictates of my religion, it should provide 
the rules by which our government operates” without more would not overcome the “pressing 
social need” requirement of both the ICCPR and the ECHR. Theoretically, a large religious 
group’s expression of such sentiments and intent to act on them could pose a threat to public 
order. Without an express threat of “undemocratic” activity, however, a mere possibility that 
such sentiment would threaten the public order or the fundamental rights of another would 
usually be too attenuated (and thus not pressing enough) under certain ECHR cases to require the 
group to dissolve or discontinue dissemination of the views.146 Thus, in Refah Partisi, the Court 
should have focused solely on the problematic violent statements of the political party rather than 
on a generalized need to protect the secular nature of the state from unpopular and critical views. 
Similarly, in Kalac and Baspinar the Court should not have entertained the idea that membership 
144
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principles.
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in a certain religious group or “failure to uphold” the principle of secularism as such could be 
grounds (even if not sole grounds) for dismissal from a government position. This is not to say 
that such dismissals could not occur if the nature of the religious expression is truly threatening. 
However, the Court’s decisions in deference to the principle of secularism set dangerous 
precedent for restriction solely on the basis of membership in a religious group.
Turkey and France might argue that the government has a legitimate interest in protecting 
the secular character of government from religious influence because to do otherwise would give 
the appearance of an endorsement or establishment of a particular religious view. However, the 
ICCPR and the ECHR religion clauses do not forbid establishing a state religion so long as that 
establishment does not discriminate against other religions or curtail the religious freedom of 
members of the non-state or majority religion. Even assuming a state has a legitimate interest in 
avoiding an establishment of religion (and I believe it does), the ECHR “principle of secularism”
cases do not involve the danger of government established religion. Instead, they all involve the 
religious manifestations of individuals or groups that express ideas in opposition to the 
government or expressive of unpopular religious viewpoints. The motivation of the Turkish 
government in each instance has expressly been to insulate government from influence by 
religious views. Turkey has put on no evidence that the removal of individuals from positions in 
government was necessitated by a need to avoid the appearance of an establishment of religion.
Similarly, there is no evidence that France’s ban on religious symbols wa s motivated by this 
concern, and even if it was the ban is on individuals wearing religious symbols rather than the 
public school displaying religious symbols. Thus, the religious expression the law curtails would 
not be mistaken for government endorsement of any particular religious viewpoint.
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Finally, as noted above, the necessity clauses of both instruments have in view a 
“pressing social need” to justify restrictions on religious liberty. Thus, a per se principle of 
excluding religious manifestation in public institutions (such as a blanket ban on wearing 
religious symbols) cannot possibly be justified under a strict construal of the necessity 
doctrine.147 While a situation may arise in which religious tensions in a public school, for 
instance, were so high that a temporary ban would be justified to maintain order or to protect 
others’ fundamental rights, the proscription would need to be more narrowly tailored than a 
blanket ban, the government would have to show the “pressing social need,” and the ban would 
have to be proportionate to the need. Such a showing would be burdensome indeed without 
something more than the assumption that wearing religious symbols might convey disrespect of 
the religious views of another.  The French Education Minister’s claim that the law calls for 
“mutual respect” assumes that France can show that religious symbols worn by public school 
students in France cause others to feel disrespected. It further ignores the fact that a wholly
different intent in wearing religious symbolism is likely the motivation for most wearers of 
religious symbols.148 Even if France could show that wearing such symbols caused others to feel 
disrespected, to justify the blanket ban France must then show that 1) causing another to feel 
disrespected by wearing a religious symbol is a violation of a fundamental right to not feel 
disrespected (a difficult showing to be sure), or 2) the alleged disrespect caused by the religious 
symbols was stirring up the school so as to create a threat to public order, or 3) wearing religious 
147
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symbols violated some well-ensconced moral order in France. Obviously, such a showing would 
be nearly impossible.
The ECHR’s acceptance of the principle of secularism as a justification for restricting 
religious liberty is not a faithful reading of the ICCPR and the ECHR, and improperly makes 
room for illegitimate justifications for those restrictions.
VI. Ake Green: A case study in the application of “necessity” legislation and the 
principle of secularism.
The case of Ake Green in Sweden provides a test case for the fitness of the principles 
analyzed above. Green is a pastor in Sweden who was sentenced to one month imprisonment for 
preaching and publishing a sermon in which he contended that homosexuality is immoral from a 
biblical perspective.149 In the sermon, Green called widespread practice of homosexuality “a 
deep cancerous tumor in the entire society” and connected the practice with pedophilia.150 He 
called the practice of homosexuality “sexually” twisted and lamented that the country “is facing 
a disaster of great proportions.”151 Green’s conviction came under a Swedish law prohibiting the 
expression of disrespect towards favored minority groups.152 The conviction and sentence were 
overturned by the Swedish appeals court in February 2005, which said that “it is not the role of a 
government composed of men to declare what is orthodoxy by punishing those who publicly 
teach one religious view of what is right, even if that view may offend others.”153 It held that 
Green had a right to preach "the Bible's categorical condemnation of homosexual relations as a 
sin," even if that position was "alien to most citizens" and even if Green's views could be 
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"strongly questioned."154 The government is now petitioning Sweden’s Supreme Court to 
reexamine the case,155 and the Becket Fund, a religious liberty organization that filed an amicus 
brief in the case, has hinted it will pursue the case to the ECHR or the Human Rights 
Commission if need be.156
The Green case starkly raises the question of whether government may restrict clearly 
unpopular religious expression. The Becket Fund has argued in the Green case as Amici Curiae 
that Green’s religious expression “falls squarely within the protections of Article 18” of the 
ICCPR.157 The brief argued that in preaching the sermon, Green was fulfilling his role as a leader 
of his congregants to “further their faith by teaching Christian doctrine and applying it to their 
lives.”158 With regard to whether proscribing the conduct was necessary to protect public safety, 
order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others, the brief argued that 
Green did not engage in any conduct that put others at risk because he did nothing more than 
“proclaim a religious viewpoint.”159 The fact that his viewpoint was controversial and offended 
some people “does not remove his religious teaching from Article 18’s protection.”160 Finally, 
the brief noted that many religions “make claims of absolute truth in prescribing certain views to 
be correct and certain conduct to be either moral or immoral” and such propensity “may 
inevitably cause offense.” But Article 18 “provides that it is not the role of a government 
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composed of men to declare what is orthodoxy by punishing those who publicly teach one 
religious view of what is right, even if that view may offend others.”161
Is the Becket Fund’s position correct under the ICCPR and the ECHR, or did this 
manifestation of religious belief cross into a realm admitting of restriction? I predict that if the 
case makes it to the HRC or the ECHR, the conviction will not be upheld. First, the case does not 
involve the type of “influence” on government from a position of civil authority or civil servant 
as the Turkey cases do. Thus, the government of Sweden would not be able to defend the 
conviction on the ground that it is protecting democratic (or “secular”) principles of government
from undue religious influence. Second, while the sermon used rather offensive language, it did 
not advocate harm to homosexuals or threaten public disorder if the laws on homosexuality in 
Sweden are not changed. Therefore, Sweden could not defend the conviction on the public order 
grounds. The third possibility is to argue that the sermon is a threat to the public moral order 
(assuming a majority acceptance of homosexuality). However, disagreeing with a moral order is 
not equivalent to threatening a moral order, and more than a showing that the sermon challenges 
the public moral order would be required to restrict the law on that ground. This conclusion is 
supported by the ECHR position that even opinions that may shock and offend deserve 
protection.
Finally, Sweden’s best argument may be the one France makes to defend its secularism 
law, namely that the sermon “disrespects” homosexuals and causes offense to them. The facts 
show that this has clearly been the result of the sermon; in other words, Sweden is not just 
guessing that the view may offend many people. However, disrespect in general does not rise to 
the level of a justification for restriction of religious freedom. Had Green gone into a personal 
harangue directed towards an individual homosexual using the same language he used in the 
161 Id. at 5.
41
sermon, the case would pose a different challenge. Such a personal and specific attack would
quite possibly violate the fundamental rights of another and thus be subject to restriction. 
However, the distinction between a personal attack and a sermon denouncing homosexuality 
generally is an important one, because the former implicates others’ rights in a way that the latter 
does not. In this case, the Becket Fund’s argument that Green should not be restricted in teaching 
religious tenets of his faith to his congregation would likely prevail in front of either judicial 
body. This is a prediction, but some of the deferential language used by the ECHR in the Turkey 
cases could be applied in principle here and cause the case to go the other way. Even so, the 
ICCPR and the ECHR documents do not have in mind such expression as a ground for 
government restriction of the freedom to manifest religious belief.
VI. Conclusion
The ICCPR and the ECHR are designed to give significant protection to public 
manifestation of religious belief. The laws of certain countries pose threats to this protection 
because of their amorphous language and because they leave room for restriction of religious 
belief when a “necessity” for the restriction does not in fact exist. The ECHR and the HRC have 
generally made the right decisions on this score and have developed principles for curtailing the 
more egregious extensions of the language of these laws. I contend that the principle of 
secularism, however, is not sufficient, without more, to restrict religious belief, and the ECHR 
has used language in its decisions that gives inappropriate deference to government attempts to
defend restrictions on secularism grounds. The case of Ake Green in Sweden may soon give one 
of the courts a chance to decide the specific issue of restrictions on unpopular religious doctrine, 
and the outcome has the potential to shape future jurisprudence either in the direction of greater 
and proper protection of religious liberty or in the direction of greater government restriction of 
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religious liberty. Hopefully, either court would strike down Green’s conviction and would take 
care to provide a careful analysis to give future guidance in assessing the appropriate balance 
between religious liberty and legitimate government restrictions on that liberty.
